

OR91 SALT

U.S.-Soviet Draft Treaty's Provisions

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WASHINGTON, May 9 — The draft treaty limiting Soviet and American heavy bombers and intercontinental missiles is the most detailed and complex arms-control agreement ever negotiated by the two nuclear superpowers.

It establishes, for the first time, parity in the numbers of offensive strategic weapons in the arsenals of the two sides. It also places some restraints on the ability of the two powers to develop new systems during the life of the treaty, which is to expire in 1985.

The treaty package consists of more than 100 pages and, according to American officials, contains a preamble, 19 articles, a protocol dealing with the period through 1981 and a set of general principles to guide the next stage in strategic arms limitation negotiations.

In 1972, the United States and Soviet Union agreed on a treaty limiting each side's strategic defensive force to two sides with a total of 200 antiballistic missile launchers. That first strategic arms accord, known in the lexicon of arms controllers as SALT I, was amended in 1974 to permit each side only one site and 100 ABM's.

The two sides also reached an interim agreement in 1972 putting a freeze on their land-based and submarine-fired missiles. That five-year accord expired in October 1977, and as negotiations for the new treaty continued both sides informally abided by the old accord.

The new package, known as SALT II, can be described in the following manner:

Limitations

Six months after the treaty goes into effect, each side can have no more than a total of 2,400 land-based intercontinental ballistic missile launchers (ICBM's), submarine ballistic missile launchers (SLBM's), heavy bombers and air-to-surface ballistic missiles.

The United States has fewer than 2,100 strategic weapons and the Russians more than 2,500. This means the Soviet Union would have to destroy about 100 bombers or missile launchers immediately to comply with the treaty limits.

By the end of 1981, each side must reduce its force further to a total of 2,250. This means an additional cut by the Soviet Union. The United States has about 200 mothballed B-52 bombers that would be destroyed to keep within the new total.

Of that 2,250 total, each side is further limited to no more than 1,320 ICBM and SLBM launchers carrying clusters of warheads called multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV's). In addition, any bomb-

ers bearing cruise missiles with ranges of more than 360 miles (ALCM's) or carrying ballistic missiles (ALBM's) will be counted against the 1,320 ceiling.

Within the 1,320 ceiling, the Soviet and American forces are also limited to a maximum of 1,200 ICBM's and SLBM's with MIRV's. If the United States wants to have more than 120 bombers carrying cruise or ballistic missiles, it can do so at the expense of the number of ICBM's or SLBM's with MIRV's that are permitted.

In addition, there is another sublimit allowing each side only 820 ICBM's with MIRV's and the Soviet side will not be permitted to have more than the 308 so-called "heavy" ICBM's (SS-18's) now in its arsenal.

There is a ban on the construction of new land silos, and excess missiles cannot be stored at facilities near ICBM sites, so as to prevent rapid reloading and firing of missiles.

Modernization of existing missile systems is permitted within agreed limits. Each side is allowed to develop only one new type of ICBM through 1985 and it has to be a "light" missile, no heavier in destructive capacity than the SS-19, a Soviet ICBM. This would allow the American MX, the prototype for a new generation, to be developed.

There is no ban on new types of SLBM's.

There is a limit on the number of warheads that can be carried on a single missile. This issue, known as "fractionation," limits each side to 10 warheads, or "re-entry vehicles (RV)" on any new or existing ICBM. That is the number on the Soviet SS-18.

SLBM's, however, are allowed to carry as many as 14 warheads, now on American submarines, and new ones would be limited to that total.

There is also a limit on the number of ALCM's that may be carried on an plane.

It cannot exceed an average of 28 on all planes carrying ALCM's, with no more than 20 ALCM's on existing bombers.

For the purpose of the treaty, the heavy bombers are the American B-52 and the B-1 (the B-1 exists in a few prototypes), and Soviet bombers code-named Bears and Bisons by the Western military alliance. A Soviet bomber referred to by NATO as Backfire is not counted in the treaty as a heavy bomber, but the Russians have agreed in a side letter to constraints on its production.

Protocol

The protocol, to last until the end of 1981, bans the deployment of ICBM's on mobile launchers or the flight testing of ICBM's from that mode.

There is also a ban on the deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM's) and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM's) with ranges of more than 360 miles, but there is no ban on the testing of these missiles. There is also no prohibition on the testing or de-

ployment of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM's) during the protocol.

In a statement of principles to govern the third round of strategic arms talks, the two sides agree to begin negotiations as soon as possible after the present agreement takes effect.

Both sides recognize that when the protocol expires in 1981, they will be able to go ahead with mobile ICBM's, important to the American consideration of a mobile MX launcher, and to deployment of long-range GLCM's and SLCM's, important to the Western allies, which have looked to the ground-launched cruise missile as an important weapon of the 1980's and 1990's.

Verification

The treaty says that both sides will verify compliance by "national technical means," and that they will not interfere with that ability. It prohibits deliberate concealment that impedes verification of treaty provisions. There is a specific ban on deliberately denying telemetry information when that could impede compliance with the treaty. There is also a flat prohibition on putting into code information from telemetry needed for verification.

There is an agreed system for deciding whether a missile has been equipped with multiple warheads. Any missile of a type ever tested with MIRV's must be counted as a MIRV missile whether it carries multiple warheads or just one warhead. The Russians have agreed not to produce, test or deploy the SS-16, an intercontinental mobile missile, because it is too like the SS-20, an intermediate range mobile missile.

Not all heavy bombers will be counted in the treaty since the Soviet Union has some Bears that are used for reconnaissance or antisubmarine defense. Also, some Bisons are used for refueling other planes. The Americans want to build some Boeing 747's for use in carrying cruise missiles but do not want each 747 to be counted.

To get around the problem of verification, the sides have agreed on an acronym, FROD, meaning "functionally related observable difference," for distinguishing a bomber that will not be counted against the 2,250 total.

For instance, the Bears that are used for reconnaissance have a large radar installation projecting from the underside in place of bomb-bay doors. This is known as a FROD. The United States will make sure that B-52's not carrying ALCM's will be configured differently from those that do.